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PERSONS WHO ARE NOT "PERSONS":
ABSOLUTE INDIVIDUAL IMMUNITY UNDER
SECTION 1983
Sheldon H. Nahmod*
Suits brought under section 1983 of title 42 of the United States
Code have provided additional protection of constitutional rights.
Recently, the use of this statute has increased markedly resulting in
new areas of controversy. In this Article, Professor Nahmod
examines the issue of absolute individual immunity under section
1983. He explores the doctrine's historical background, the distinc-
tion between actions for damages and injunctions, and projects the
doctrine's effect on certain individuals in the future.
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code, a powerful constitu-
tional "sword" for plaintiffs, makes "persons" liable for violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment.1 Its broad facial language admits no exceptions.
Yet until recently local governmental entities were considered by the United
States Supreme Court not to be "persons" and thus not liable under the
statute's provisions.2 More surprisingly, certain individuals who are clearly
"persons" in the common understanding of that term have been given an
absolute immunity from liability for damages under 1983. 3 The purpose of
this Article is to examine and analyze who is entitled to this immunity.
*Professor of Law, lIT/Chicago-Kent College of Law; A.B., University of Chicago; LL.B.,
LL.M., Harvard University. This Article is based on a chapter from my forthcoming book,
CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO SECTION 1983, to be published
by Shepard's, Inc. in 1979 [hereinafter referred to as A GuIDE To SECTION 1983]. @1978
Sheldon H. Nahmod.
1. The section provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). For a discussion of relationship between § 1983 and the Fourteenth
Amendment, see generally Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50
IND. L.J. 1 (1974) and A GUIDE TO SECTION 1983 chapters 2 & 3. Liability under the "laws" is
beyond the scope of this Article. See A GUIDE TO SECTION 1983 chapter 2.
2. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961) (holding that municipalities are not "persons"
within section 1983), overruled in Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2041 (1978)
(holding that local governments are "persons" for purposes of section 1983). See also City of
Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
3. The emphasis is intentional. As stated in Rowley v. McMillan, 502 F.2d 1326, 1331 (4th
Cir. 1974): "the doctrine of immunity ... has no application to a suit for declaratory or injunc-
tive relief. ... See the discussion in notes 52-55, 124-133, 178-180 and accompanying text
infra.
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The difference between absolute and qualified immunity is of immense
practical significance for the individual. No inquiry into the absolutely im-
mune defendant's state of mind is permitted, while qualified immunity, an
affirmative defense, necessitates such an inquiry after the plaintiff has made
out a 1983 cause of action. 4 Typically, an action against an absolutely im-
mune defendant will be dismissed on motion which simply sets'out his status
and his having acted within his official capacity.
The Supreme Court to date has established three classes of absolutely
immune individual defendants: state legislators,5 judges, 6 and prosecutors. 7
This Article will deal with the Court's reasoning in the leading cases, and
consider its implications. It will also explore the scope of absolute immunity,
and analyze the use made by the circuits of the Court's decisions. As will be
seen, certain line drawing problems emerge which are not alleviated, espe-
cially in judicial immunity cases, by the Court's use of jurisdictional ter-
minology.
LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES:
TENNEY V. BRANDHOVE
The Supreme Court first established an absolute immunity for persons
from section 1983 actions in Tenney v. Brandhove.8  The plaintiff sought
damages under section 1983 against various individuals, including the mem-
bers of the California Senate Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American
Activities. He claimed they had intimidated him in the exercise of his consti-
tutional rights by wrongfully interrogating him and prosecuting him for
contempt in the course of their investigation. The Court, per Justice
Franldurter, held that state legislators have an absolute immunity from liabil-
ity for damages when they act "in a field where legislators traditionally have
power to act.... "9  Characterizing the Committee's investigation as within
those bounds, 10 the Court found the Committee's members absolutely im-
mune despite a claim of "unworthy purpose."
4. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). The Court stated that the qualified immunity
test contains both objective and subjective elements and held that
a school board member is not immune from liability for damages under § 1983 if he
knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of
official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected,
or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of con-
stitutional rights or other injury to the student.
Id. at 322. See generally A GUIDE TO SECTION 1983 chapter 8.
5. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
6. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
7. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
8. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
9. Id. at 379.
10. The Court noted:
Investigations, whether by standing or special committees, are an established part
of representative government ....
To find that a committee's investigation has exceeded the bounds of legislative
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The Court's reasoning is worth noting. It interpreted 1983's "person" lan-
guage against a common law background of absolute legislative immunity
from tort liability derived from English law and early American history. The
Court also emphasized the policy underlying the Speech or Debate clause of
the United States Constitution," suggesting that it "was a reflection of polit-
ical principles already firmly established in the States."' 12  Against this
background the Court examined the legislative intent behind 1983 and con-
cluded that it would be implausible to infer that Congress intended to over-
turn the historical tradition of legislative freedom by subjecting legislators to
civil liability for acts performed while engaging in legislative activity.' 3 The
Court noted: "We cannot believe that Congress-itself a staunch advocate of
legislative freedom-would impinge on a tradition so well grounded in his-
tory and reason by covert inclusion in the general language before us."'
1 4
Despite the broad language of section 1983 and Justice Douglas' dissent,
15
the result in Tenney is probably justified for its concern with the democratic
process and the chilling effect potential litigation might have upon the inde-
pendence of legislators. Tenney prevents any inquiry into legislative motive,
no matter how allegedly corrupt, so long as the legislator is acting in a tra-
ditional legislative field. Thus, the remedies for such corruption must be the
political process and the criminal laws.
1 6
While Tenney establishes that legislators are absolutely immune from sec-
tion 1983 damages liability under appropriate circumstances, it fails to
delineate what those circumstances might be and what acts of such an indi-
vidual are protected. Tenney tells us that a legislative committee's investiga-
tion is within the field to which absolute immunity attaches, 1 7 but it does not
address the question of whether legislative employees or local legislatures
such as city councils are within the sphere of absolute immunity. Tenney
also gives no real indication of the standards which courts should use in
distinguishing between traditional and nontraditional legislative fields. Fi-
nally, and more generally, Tenney leaves open the question of which other
governmental officials might be absolutely immune because of a similar
background of absolute immunity.
power it must be obvious that there was a usurpation of functions exclusively vested
in the Judiciary or the Executive. The present case does not present such a situa-
tion. Id. at 377-78.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
12. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373 (1951).
13. Id. at 376.
14. Id.
15. He argued that "when a committee perverts its power, brings down on an individual the
whole weight of government for an illegal or corrupt purpose, the reason for the immunity
ends." Id. at 383. His argument appears in effect to be for a qualified immunity, although he
never used that term.
16. "[W]e have never held that the performance of the duties of judicial, legislative, or
executive officers, requires or contemplates the immunization of otherwise criminal deprivations
of constitutional rights." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974). See also Gravel v.
United States, 408 U.S. 606, 627 (1972).
17. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951).
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State Legislators and Protected Legislative Conduct
Once the defendant's status is found to be that of a state legislator, the
next issue is whether the challenged act is legislative in nature. The extreme
cases are relatively easy to deal with. At one extreme the act of a state
legislator in driving negligently and injuring another is not a legislative act
and, moreover, it may not even be an act under color of law."' At the other
extreme is the situation in which the state legislator is sued under section
1983 for enacting certain state legislation. Here it is unquestioned that abso-
lute immunity attaches. Tenney is obviously closer to the latter extreme than
to the former. The Court first asked whether investigative hearings were a
traditionally legislative function. Then, as a way of determining whether
there was a legislative act, it asked whether the specific investigation had
exceeded the "bounds of legislative power." The test for such a conclusion
was: "it must be obvious that there was a usurpation of function exclusively
vested in the Judiciary or Executive."1 9 On the merits the Courts had little
difficulty in answering these questions in defendant's favor.
Following Tenney, courts in 1983 cases readily applied its reasoning to
state legislators who voted for certain legislation 20 or housekeeping reso-
lutions. 2 ' Legislators' participation in committee work 22 and on a statutory
commission 23 has also been covered by the Tenney reasoning. These activi-
ties are clearly legislative acts and are properly protected. Furthermore,
since Tenney, the Supreme Court has elaborated on the attributes of legisla-
tive acts under the Speech or Debate Clause upon which Tenney so heavily
relied.2 4 It stated that for purposes of congressional immunity, protected
matters under that clause "must be an integral part of the deliberative and
communicative processes by which members participate in Committee and
18. Clearly these two inquiries are often factually related. An affirmative finding on state
action will tend to lead to a similar finding on official capacity. However, this does not mean
that the two inquiries are identical. In regard to state action, see generally A GUIDE TO SEC-
TION 1983 chapter 2, and J. NOVAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 451-75
(1978).
19. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951).
20. City of Safety Harbor v. Birchfield, 529 F.2d 1251, 1256 (5th Cir. 1976); Johnson v.
Reagan, 524 F.2d 1123, 1124 (9th Cir. 1975).
21. Eslinger V. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 228 (4th Cir. 1973).
22. Gambocz v. Subcommittee on Claims of Joint Legislative Comm., 423 F.2d 674, 675 (3d
Cir. 1970).
23. Bergman v. Stein, 404 F. Supp. 287, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
24. See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501 (1975) (hold-
ing that the Speech or Debate Clause protected the actions of the Senate Subcommittee on
Internal Security in issuing a subpoena for bank records involving respondent in order to de-
termine whether respondent's coffee houses and underground newspapers were potentially
harmful to the morale of the U.S. Armed Forces); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 313, 315
(1973) (holding that the Speech or Debate Clause protected the actions of the members and staff
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House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or rejec-
tion of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the Con-
stitution places within the jurisdiction of either House." 25 Applying this
standard to "legislative acts," the Court held in one case that Speech or De-
bate Clause absolute immunity does not extend to a Senator's alleged private
arrangement with a private publisher to publish the Pentagon Papers, 26 and
indicated in a subsequent case that a congressman who arranges for the pub-
lic (as distinguished from internal) distribution of committee materials al-
legedly infringing upon the rights of individuals is similarly not absolutely
immune.2 7 The Court's reasoning in these cases is that, despite arguments
for a legislative "informing function," such acts go beyond the reasonable
requirements of the legislative function.
Circuit courts have also been sensitive to those situations in which legis-
lators act officially but not legislatively. Several circuits have held that under
those circumstances absolute immunity is inappropriate. In a recent New
Jersey district court decision,2 8 the court concluded that absolute immunity
did not protect state legislators who were accused of improperly excluding
another legislator from a party caucus. While sufficient state involvement
was found for state action purposes, the court merely asserted that this was
an area in which legislators traditionally did not act.
Davis v. Passman,2 9 a better reasoned opinion, involved the official im-
munity of a congressman sued for damages for sex discrimination against a
staff employee. The Fifth Circuit curtly rejected the congressman's defense
of absolute immunity. The court first observed that "the constitutional pros-
cription of blatant sex discrimination does not impair [the defendant's]
legitimate control over his staff to any extent at all." 30 Next, after canvassing
the Speech or Debate Clause cases, the court concluded that "legislators are
not legislating when they dismiss staff members. For the same reasons that the
of the House Special Select Subcommittee in the preparation and distribution of a report on the
District of Columbia public school system that documented disciplinary problems of named
students. The Court found further that the public dissemination of the report by the Superin-
tendent of Documents and Public Printer was not a legislative act and, therefore, not protected
by the Speech or Debate Clause); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972) (holding
that a Senator's arrangement for private publication of a report prepared by the Department of
Defense is not an act within the legislative sphere and, therefore, not protected by the Speech
or Debate Clause).
25. Id. at 625.
26. Id. at 622.
27. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973). The arrangement must go beyond merely voting
for it. Id. at 315.
28. Ammond v. McGahn, 390 F. Supp. 655 (D. N.J. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 532
F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1976).
29. 544 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3301 (October 30, 1978).
30. Id. at 870.
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Speech and Debate clause does not extend to staff dismissals, [the defend-
ant] cannot invoke absolute immunity." 31
The Fifth Circuit's insistence that "the immunized act must be intimately
cognate to the legislative process" 3 2 is similarly appropriate in a 1983 con-
text. As observed, the Tenney Court reasoned from both the historical pur-
pose of the Speech or Debate Clause and the concern, in the Fifth Circuit's
words, "that the prospect of an unsuccessful but burdensome lawsuit might
affect a legislator's performance of his or her legislative duties, thus distort-
ing the democratic process." 3 3  There is thus a class of cases in which a
state legislator acting within his official capacity may be denied an absolute
immunity because his act is not legislative in nature. Further, such a result
may occur even where the state legislator has acted with a reasonable good
faith belief that he has absolute immunity. It is true that this is not discussed
in Davis, Tenney, or any of the Speech or Debate Clause cases (perhaps
because it was not raised). Still, these cases appear to use an objective test
for the "legislative act" inquiry, with no attention paid to the legislator's
state of mind. 3 ' However, the state of mind of a legislator denied an abso-
lute immunity is certainly relevant to the application to him of a qualified
immunity.3 5
State Legislative Employees
There has been some confusion in the cases about the proper treatment of
section 1983 suits for damages against legislative employees. Tenney, stand-
ing alone, suggests that such employees are "persons" for 1983 purposes.
3 6
Courts generally have held, however, that legislative employees are pro-
31. Id. at 881.
32. Id. at 879.
33. id.
34. See notes 103-05 and accompanying text infra regarding "judicial acts."
35. An issue which has apparently not as yet arisen is the possibility of a Fourteenth
Amendment action for damages against state legislators, judges and prosecutors who have an
absolute immunity under both the common law and section 1983. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing a federal cause of action for damages caused
be federal agents' violation of the Fourth Amendment). However, it is likely that absolute im-
munity will survive such a Fourteenth Amendment challenge. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d. Cir. 1972).
36. The Tenney Court cited Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881), in which a judg-
ment was entered against the House's Sergeant-at-Arms for an illegal arrest, the court said:
"Legislative privilege in such a case [where the defendants are members of a legislature] de-
serves greater respect than where an official acting on behalf of the legislature is sued .... " 341
U.S. at 378. This proposition was reiterated in Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967).
(Vol. 28:1
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tected only by a qualified immunity. 37  Several have gone so far as to hold
certain legislative employees absolutely immune from personal liability. The
Fifth Circuit, relying on Tenney, has said that employee-investigators of a
statutorily established investigative commission are absolutely immune from
liability for damages. 38  An Indiana District Court has held the same for
legislative employees. 39  These decisions are questionable not only in light
of Tenney's dictum but also because legislative employees are different from
legislators in that they do not require the same autonomy in decision making
so necessary for the effective operation of representative government. A
qualified immunity appears sufficient for most purposes to ensure that
employees are not unduly hampered by litigation and deterred from per-
forming their jobs.4"
A significant qualification, however, to the suggested general applicability
of a qualified immunity to legislative employees must be made. In several
Speech or Debate Clause cases, the Supreme Court put a gloss on its lan-
guage in Tenney and extended absolute immunity to Congressional aides,
committee staff and committee consultants who investigated and introduced
material at committee hearings.4 1 In determining whether these acts were
legislative acts and thus absolutely immune, the Court was concerned with
"freeing the legislator from executive and judicial oversight that realistically
threatens to control his conduct as a legislator."42 It therefore asked
whether the acts would have been protected had they been done by the
legislator himself. To the extent that these Speech or Debate Clause cases
are relevant to the 1983 legislative immunity issue by analogy, the inquiry
must focus not only on the defendant's status but also on the nature of the
act itself. Viewed in this light, a legislative employee is only absolutely im-
37. See, e.g., Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 229-30 (4th Cir. 1973). The Eslinger de-
fendant, Clerk of the South Carolina Senate, who, in good faith reliance on official custom,
refused plaintiff temporary employment as a page in the Senate because she was female, was
held immune from liability for damages but not immune from suit for equitable relief.
38. Martone v. McKeithen, 413 F.2d 1373, 1376 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam).
39. Porter v. Bainbridge, 405 F. Supp. 83, 91 (S.D. Ind. 1975). The court neither set forth
reasoning for nor offered citations in support of this holding. Also, while the court spoke of
immunity, the case actually seemed to involve injunctive relief and federalism concerns. Id. at
85, 90-91.
40. See note 4 supra. See generally on qualified immunity A GUIDE TO SECTION 1983 chap-
ter 8. A case with an interesting twist is Saffloti v. Wilson, 392 F. Supp. 1335, 1343 n.10 (S.D.
N.Y. 1975), in which the court in dictum compared a governor, who was sued for injunctive
relief after exercising his veto power, with a legislator. This suggests that the governor should
be protected by an absolute immunity. This result seems questionable after Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232 (1974), which held that executives are protected only by a qualified immunity, and
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), which held the same for school board members re-
gardless of whether they acted in quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions. In any event, the
court resolved the matter on the merits in favor of the governor. 392 F. Supp. at 1347.
41. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
42. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. at 618 (emphasis added).
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mune from liability under 1983 when his act is legislative in nature, such
that, had the legislator himself performed it, he would have been immune.
43
Local Legislators
The current general rule is that local legislators are not given the Tenney
absolute immunity. A leading Sixth Circuit case, Nelson v. Knox, 44 involved
a suit for damages against city commissioners and others for allegedly inten-
tionally destroying the plaintiff's garage business by enacting and enforcing
arbitrary and discriminatory ordinances. Judge (later Justice) Stewart, writ-
ing for the court, said first that the scope of the commissioners' immunity
under 1983 was a question of federal, not state, law. Then, relying in part on
the Supreme Court's decision in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organi-
zation,4 5 Judge Stewart held that the commissioners "were not clothed with
complete immunity but enjoyed instead a qualified privilege."-46  Judge
Stewart acknowledged that Hague involved injunctive relief, not damages,
but contended that this made no difference. More to the point, Judge
43. This approach to a legislative employee's immunity is similar to the approach used for
determining the scope of immunity of a judicial employee who is following a judge's order or
direction. See notes 120-123 and accompanying text infra. An additional factor justifying these
approaches is the unfairness to a legislative or judicial employee in withholding an absolute
immunity while the person responsible for the challenged conduct-the person ordering it-
gets its protection.
44. 256 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1958).
45. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
46. 256 F.2d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 1958). Later circuit court cases have applied Nelson and a
narrow reading of Tenney to a variety of fact situations. See, e.g., Thomas v. Younglove, 545
F.2d 1171, 1173 (9th Cir. 1976) (applied to county supervisors allegedly discriminating against
public employees who were members of a union); Lane v. Inman, 509 F.2d 184, 186 (5th Cir.
1975) (applied to the members of an aldermanic police committee accused of illegally revoking a
cab driver's city permit); Curry v. Gillette, 461 F.2d 1003, 1005 (6th Cir. 1972) (applied to a
city's aldermen accused of racial discrimination against plaintiff's ambulance service); Lynch v.
Johnson, 420 F.2d 818, 821 (6th Cir. 1970) (applied to the members of a county's fiscal court
accused of violating procedural due process). The Lynch court was not an ordinary judicial
tribunal but rather had entirely legislative and administrative powers. Federal district courts
have usually done the same. See, e.g., Kucinich v. Forbes, 432 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D. Ohio
1977); Owen v. City of Independence, 421 F. Supp. 1110 (W.D. Mo. 1976) aff'd, 560 F.2d 925
(8th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 3118 (1978). Smetanka v. Borough of Ambridge, 378 F.
Supp. 1366 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
There are several cases which have taken a contrary view, based either upon reading Tenney
broadly to protect individuals who legislate at any governmental level or on an interpretation of
the common law which confers absolute immunity. See, e.g., Shannon Fredericksburg Motor
Inn, Inc. v. Hicks, 434 F. Supp. 803 (E.D. Va. 1977); Teamsters Local Union No. 822 v. City
of Portsmouth, 423 F. Supp. 954, 956 (E.D. Va. 1975). The Shannon court, after canvassing the
relevant cases and arguments, concluded: "If indeed there is a rational basis for distinguishing
the safeguards necessary to permit local legislators to carry out their legislative duties from
those which have been clearly accorded the state legislators, same escapes the Court." 434 F.
Supp. at 805.
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Stewart accepted the view of Judge Magruder in Cobb v. City of Malden4 7
who concluded that local legislators should not be absolutely immune under
section 1983 because they only have a qualified immunity at common law.
It is not at all clear what the Supreme Court would do if the scope of
immunity for local government legislators was presented for review. Tenney
involved state legislators and the Court compared the historical functions of
state legislators and congressmen. Also, according to Judge Magruder in
Cobb, the common law rule regarding the immunity of local legislators from
liability is that it is qualified, not absolute. Further, even if this were not so,
later Supreme Court decisions have made it clear that while common law
immunity rules for governmental officials may be relevant, they are not dis-
positive of 1983 immunity.48  On the other hand, Tenney may be read as
functionally emphasizing the need for absolute immunity for legislators, re-
gardless of governmental level. 49  Additionally, the common law immunity
rules may not have been correctly interpreted by Judge Magruder in Cobb.
It has been stated 50 that only a "scant majority" of the states accord a qual-
ified immunity for defamation. For other torts the general rule seems to
grant absolute immunity for inferior legislative bodies and for state and na-
tional legislators.
What the Court should do when confronted with this issue depends in
part on whether expansion or limitation of absolute legislative immunity
under 1983 is considered preferable. On balance, local legislators should not
be accorded absolute immunity. Unlike state legislatures, local legislatures
are creations of the states and do not possess that independence which is to
be furthered by an absolute immunity rule. Thus, the Speech or Debate
clause analogy is not applicable to local legislators. Also, because they fre-
quently exercise a mix of legislative and administrative powers, local legis-
lators are more akin to state and local administrative agency members who
are entitled only to a qualified immunity. 5 1  Furthermore, it must be
remembered that an expansion of the category of absolutely immune defend-
47. 202 F.2d 701, 707 (1st Cir. 1953) (concurring opinion). This is apparently the current
rule in the First Circuit. Gaffney v. Silk, 488 F.2d 1248 (1st Cir. 1973), applied a qualified
immunity to local legislators for legislative acts.
48. E.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
49. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), the Court's post-Tenney decision on absolute judi-
cial immunity, may also be relevant because there the judge was a "'municipal police justice."
The Court in Pierson was concerned, however, not with the level of government at which the
individual judged, but rather with the judicial function. See text accompanying notes 57-66
infra. Cf. Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353, 1365 (9th Cir. 1977
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 91 REH denied, 99 S. Ct. 599) (1978), in which the court, in a case of
first impression, stated that officers legislating under the authority of an interstate compact have
absolute immunity because "such compacts, by their very nature, establish regional legislatures
.... [and we] discern no reason why these 'regional legislators' should not be accorded the
same immunity as their state and national counterparts.
50. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 782, 788 (4th ed. 1971).
51. E.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (school board members who "execute,"
i.e. administer, "legislate," i.e. promulgate regulations, and "judge," i.e. adjudicate, are en-
tilted only to qualified immunity).
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ants flies in the face 1983's "person" language. Additional expansion
requires weighty justification, justification which is not present for local legis-
lators. Finally, in contrast to the settled common law absolute immunity of
state legislators, the common law immunity rules for local legislators are, as
noted, somewhat unclear.
It should be noted that legislative immunity, even for state legislators, is
limited to damages and does not extend to prohibitory injunctive relief. As
the Fourth Circuit recently stated: "we have found [no case] which holds
that the immunity doctrine insulates a public official or public employee
from injunctive relief to prevent what would otherwise be an illegal act on
his part." 52 This is also the clear implication of a Supreme Court decision5 3
which permitted injunctive relief under 1983 against certain members of the
Georgia State Legislature. Furthermore, limiting legislative immunity in this
way follows from the emphasis in Tenney and the decisions in the circuits on
avoiding the chilling effect of' potential 1983 damages litigation upon legisla-
tive independence. At least one circuit court has been reluctant, however, to
issue a mandatory injunction with the apparent effect of fbrcing legislators to
vote in a certain way. 54 The court said: "Quite simply, it would have been
a violation of the separation of powers with the court acting as a legisla-
ture."-55 A comparable reluctance to issue mandatory injunctions interfering
with judicial discretion appears in several judicial immunity cases.5 6
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES:
PIERSON V. RAY
Pierson v. Ray 5 7 established absolute judicial immunity ftom liability for
damages under section 1983. In Pierson, the plaintiffs had been arrested by
the defendant police officers, convicted and given the maximum sentence by
the defendant municipal police justice for violating a Mississippi breach of
the peace statute. 58 After plaintiffs had been vindicated in a trial de novo,
they sued the defendants for damages under 1983 as well as for false arrest
and imprisonment at common law.
In holding that the municipal police justice was absolutely immune from
liability for damages under 1983,' 9 the Court compared judicial immunity at
common law with legislative immunity. Following Tenney's apprbach, the
Court stated that the legislative history of section 1983 did not indicate an
52. Rowley v. McMillan, 502 F.2d 1326, 1332 (4th Cir. 1974).
53. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
54. Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Hous. Auth., 500 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1974).
55. Id. at 1092.
56. See notes 138-149 and accompanying text infra.
57. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
58. This statute was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court as applied to similar facts
several years later. Thomas v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 524 (1965).
59. 386 U.S. 547, 553 (1967).
[Vol. 28:1
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intention to abolish the common law immunity of judges. 60  The Court also
observed that the only role the police justice played was to find plaintiffs
guilty. It then went on to hold that judges should be absolutely immune
from liability for damages for acts within their judicial jurisdiction in order to
preserve the autonomy of judicial decision-making. 61
An interpretation of section 1983 as excluding judges6 2 is more question-
able than Pierson's interpretation excluding state legislators. As Justice
Douglas, dissenting in Pierson, pointed out, the legislative history of section
1983 and its criminal law counterpart, now 18 U.S.C. § 242, indicates that it is to
apply to judges and that, indeed, "[i]t was recognized that certain members
of the judiciary were instruments of oppression and were partially responsi-
ble for the wrongs to be remedied." 63  It has also been suggested that, in
contrast with the history of legislative immunity set out in Tenney, 64 judicial
immunity at common law was not so well established as the Court thought
in Pierson.
Nevertheless, the result in Pierson was probably inevitable given Tenney's
approach to reading section 1983 against a background of common law im-
munity. It is worth noting in this connection that with few exceptions,6 5
60. The Court noted:
The legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish
wholesale all common-law immunities .... The immunity of judges for acts within
the judicial role is [as] equally well established [as absolute legislative immunity],
and we presume that Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to
abolish the doctrine.
Id. at 554.
61. The Court reasoned that judges are absolutely immune from liability for damages
for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction ... even when the judge is
accused of acting maliciously and corruptly .... It is a judge's duty to decide all
cases within his jurisdiction that are brought before him, including controversial
cases that arouse the most intense feelings in the litigants. His errors may be cor-
rected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may
hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption. Imposing such a burden on
judges would contribute not to principled and fearless decision-making but to in-
timidation.
Id. (emphasis added).
62. There is no serious question as to Congress' power to impose criminal sanctions upon
state judges for constitutional violations. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879). The same is
true for civil liability. In Pierson, of course, the question was one of congressional intent, not
power.
63. 386 U.S. at 563. He argues in effect for a qualified immunity for judges. See also Kates,
Immunity of State Judges Under the Federal Civil Rights Act: Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered, 65
Nw. U. L. REv. 615 (1970).
64. 341 U.S. 367, 372-375. See Comment, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983,
79 YALE L.J. 322 (1969), in which the author states that "judicial immunity was not a universal
doctrine." Id. at 325. Under common law, although superior judges were "absolutely immune
... justices of the peace .. .were liable to civil suit if they acted maliciously." Id. See also
Note, Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1133 (1977).
65. One early exception was Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945),
overruled Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966), cert denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967).
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federal courts, especially after Tenney, and even before Pierson, began to
apply the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity consistently.6 6 Con-
sequently, after Pierson, the question is no longer the existence of absolute
judicial immunity, but rather its scope. Pierson indicates that the immunity
only applies to acts within "judicial jurisdiction." This, however, does little
to define the scope of judicial immunity. Pierson, a relatively easy case
which involved a judge who clearly acted in a traditional judicial capacity,
held, not surprisingly, that a judge acts within his judicial jurisdiction even if
he applies a statute unconstitutionally.
"'Judicial Jurisdiction," Bradley v. Fisher and Stump v. Sparkman:
The Scope of Judicial Immunity from Liability for Damages
While it was relatively easy in Pierson to find that the police justice acted
within his "judicial jurisdiction," Pierson did not determine the scope of
judicial jurisdiction. This term was coined in Bradley v. Fisher,67 an 1871 Supreme
Court decision cited with approval in Pierson, in which a criminal court
judge for the District of Columbia was sued for damages by a lawyer whom
he removed from practice before his court without notice and the opportu-
nity to defend. The Court elaborately set out the general rules which define
judicial jurisdiction:
[J]udges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil
actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their
jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corniptly. A
distinction must be here observed between excess ofjurisdiction and the
clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter. Where there is
clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority exercised is a
usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want
of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible. But where
jurisdiction over the subject-matter is invested by law in the judge, or in
the court which he holds, the manner and extent in which the jurisdiction
shall be exercised are generally as inuch questions for his determination as
any other questions involved in the case, although upon the correctness ofJ
his determination in these particulars the validity of his judgments may
depend. 68
66. So noted in Pierson. 386 U.S. at 555 n.9.
67. 80 U.S. 335 (1871). Bradley is, of course, not a 1983 case.
68. id. at 351-352 (emphasis added). The Court continued, illustrating the dichotomy be-
tween acts in excess of jurisdiction and acts performed in the absence of all jurisdiction:
Thus, if a probate court, invested only with authority over wills and the settlement
of estates of deceased persons, should proceed to try parties for public offences,
jurisdiction over the subject of offences being entirely wanting in the court, and this
being necessarily known to its judge, his commission would afford no protection to
him in the exercise of the usurped authority. But if on the other hand a judge of a
criminal court, invested with general criminal jurisdiction over offences committed
within a certain district, should hold a particular act to be a public offence, which is
not by the law made an offence, and proceed to the arrest and trial of a party
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In applying these principles to the facts before it, the Supreme Court in
Bradley observed that while the defendant judge had the power to remove a
lawyer from the bar, this should not ordinarily be done without notice and
the opportunity to explain and defend. Nevertheless, even though the de-
fendant judge erred in not giving plaintiff such notice, this constituted at
most an excess of jurisdiction but "did not make the act any less a judicial
act; .. .[it was not] as though the court had proceeded without any jurisdic-
tion whatever over its attoreys." 69  Thus, the defendant judge was abso-
lutely immune from liability for damages for the allegedly wrongful disbar-
ment.
Several matters are noteworthy. First and foremost is the distinction the
Court draws between "excess of jurisdiction" and the "clear absence of all
jurisdiction" over the subject matter. Second, the Court mentions subject
matter jurisdiction several times, but mentions jurisdiction over the person
only once. In Bradley, it appears that while the defendant judge may not
have given the plaintiff notice of the disbarment, the judge retained personal
jurisdiction over the plaintiff although the jury in the case in which plaintiff
and defendant were involved had already been discharged. 70  However, the
relevance of personal jurisdiction is nowhere made clear.
Moreover, the two examples set forth by the Court 71 are intriguing. The
first concerns a probate judge who tries criminal offenses; he acts, according
to Bradley, in clear absence of all jurisdiction. In its discussions, the Court
may have intimated that the probate judge's state of mind is relevant to a
finding of clear absence of all jurisdiction because it spoke at one point of
this clear absence as "necessarily known" to the probate judge, and at
another juncture similarly qualified its clear absence rule by adding "when
the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge." 72 The Court may have set
out a test for judicial immunity that includes both objective and subjective
elements: the judge must know of a clear absence of subject matter jurisdic-
tion which exists in fact before he loses his immunity.
charged with such act, or should sentence a party convicted to a greater punish-
ment than that authorized by the law upon its proper construction, no personal
liability to civil action for such acts would attach to the judge, although those acts
would be in excess of his jurisdiction, or of the jurisdiction of the court held by
him, for these are particulars for his judicial consideration, whenever his general
jurisdiction over the subject-matter is invoked. Indeed some of the most difficult
and embarrassing questions which a judicial officer is called upon to consider and
determine relate to his jurisdiction, or that of the court held by him, or the manner
in which the jurisdiction shall be exercised. And the same principle of exemption
from liability which obtains for errors committed in the ordinary prosecution of a
suit where there is jurisdiction of both subject and person, applies in cases of this
kind, and for the same reasons.
Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 357.
70. Id. at 356-57.
71. Id. at 352.
72. id.
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The Court's second example concerns a judge with general criminal juris-
diction who either convicts a person of an act which is not in fact criminal or
gives a person an unauthorized sentence. 73 This judge, according to the
Court, has acted only in excess of jurisdiction and does not lose his judicial
immunity. The puzzling aspect is why the Court characterizes this as juris-
dictional, when it appears to be an error of law going to the merits. Further,
suppose it is somehow jurisdictional. If the judge knows in fact that the act
is not a crime or that the sentence is unauthorized, does he then act in clear
absence of jurisdiction?
Pierson retained the jurisdictional language of Bradley in holding that the
police justice acted within his "judicial jurisdiction." Indeed, as mentioned,
applying the Bradley approach in Pierson is rather straightforward and poses
no serious problems, because the police justice clearly had both subject mat-
ter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. In Bradley's terms, he acted, at
most, only in excess of his jurisdiction when he convicted the plaintiffs
under an unconstitutionally applied statute. Also, because the Pierson court
did not even inquire whether he knowingly did so, this suggests a judge's
state of mind is irrelevant when he makes a legal error. He would not lose
his absolute immunity regardless of his alleged state of mind; he would still
have acted only in excess of jurisdiction in Bradley's terms. 74 Such a result
seems consistent with the emphasis in both Bradley and Pierson on prevent-
ing litigants from challenging a judge's motivation and on encouraging resort
instead to the appellate process to correct legal errors.
In considering the implications of Bradley and Pierson, those relatively
few cases in which courts have held that judges lose their absolute immunity
are helpful in evaluating the proper scope of judicial immunity. 75  A Sixth
73. Id.
74. The Mississippi statute involved in Pierson was, it is true, held unconstitutional as
applied to similar facts only after the police justice convicted the plaintiffs. See note 58 supra.
However, the Supreme Court, in Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960), had previously held
a similar statute unconstitutional as applied to virtually identical facts. Boynton was apparently
brought to the timely attention of the police justice. See Kates, Immunity of State Judges Under
the Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 615, 617 (1970).
75. Also illustrative of the proper scope of judicial immunity are those circuit court cases
which, following the Bradley-Pierson jurisdictional approach, have held absolute judicial immu-
nity applicable to section 1983 allegations. See, e.g., Humble v. Foreman, 563 F.2d 780, 781
(5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (judge conspired with prosecutor and defense counsel during plea
bargaining to deny plaintiff effective assistance of counsel); Conner v. Pickett, 552 F.2d 585, 586
(5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (judge violated plaintiff's civil rights by convicting him for posses-
sion of narcotics paraphernalia); Dean v. Shirer, 547 F.2d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 1976) (judge,
following a trial and the plaintiff's disparaging comments about him to a crowd outside the
courtroom, had plaintiff, an attorney, brought back into the courtroom, threatened him with
bodily harm and jail, and forced him to retract his earlier comments; judge still retained subject
matter jurisdiction over the case and his acts were judicial acts because they were part of his
exercise of the contempt power); Keeton v. Guedry, 544 F.2d 199, 200 (5th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam) (judge issued a warrant for the arrest of plaintiff for stopping payment on a check after
discovering defects in a purchased truck, an act which was not a criminal offense; court em-
phasized that judge "clearly believed that criminal conduct possibly had occurred."); Harley v.
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Circuit decision, Lucarell v. McNair, held that a plaintiff who alleged that a
juvenile court referee illegally incarcerated him in connection with traffic
court proceedings stated a cause of action. The referee acted in "absence of
all jurisdiction" because, according to the complaint, he lacked power to
incarcerate under state law. 76  A similar and much cited Ohio district court
case, Wade v. Bethesda Hospital,77 involved a 1983 claim against a probate
judge who allegedly conspired with others to sterlize the plaintiff.7 In con-
sidering whether the defendant "acted outside the scope of his jurisdiction,"
the court set out the following three pronged test:
Oliver, 539 F.2d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir. 1976) (probate judge, who had statutory jurisdiction over
guardianships, caused emotional distress when he improperly denied plaintiff custody of her
minor son); Grundstrom v, Darnell, 531 F.2d 272, 273 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (justice of
the peace, who has subject matter jurisdiction and is to be treated like any other judge,
improperly denied bail to plaintiff); Wiggins v. Hess, 531 F.2d 920, 921 (8th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam) (judge from one county who specially presided over plaintiff's criminal trial in another
county improperly issued an order for his arrest and commitment under the seal of the first
county and also improperly imprisoned him for a crime which carried no prison sentence);
Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 205 (3d Cir. 1975) (judge improperly withheld information
regarding plaintiff's illegal extradition from Canada, thereby resulting in plaintiff's imprison-
ment); Duba v. McIntyre, 501 F.2d 590, 591 (8th Cir. 1974) (justice of the peace ordered the
attachment and sale of plaintiff's entire stock of hogs on the pretext of satisfying a $55 mis-
demeanor fine; conceding that justice of the peace acted in excess of jurisdiction, the court held
that his acts were within the general power of judges to issue executions to recover fines im-
posed for violations of municipal ordinances); Barnes v. Dorsey, 480 F.2d 1057, 1060 (8th Cir.
1973) (judge who presided at a burglary trial conspired with others in order to suppress certain
exonerating information in a police report); Mississippi ex rel Giles v. Thomas, 464 F.2d 156,
158-59 (5th Cir. 1972) (justice of the peace wrongfully entered a default order evicting plaintiff
because the summons contained an erroneous return date); Robinson v. McCorkle, 462 F.2d
111, 113 (3d Cir. 1972) (judge ordered the plaintiff committed under a repealed statute "such
judicial miscue does not remove the shield of immunity."); Jacobson v. Schaefer, 441 F.2d 127,
130 (7th Cir. 1971) (judge improperly attached certain conditions to plaintiff's bail; although
judge did not in fact have authority to do what he did-court emphasized that he had general
jurisdiction over the subject matter); Berg v. Cwiklinski, 416 F.2d 929, 931 (7th Cir. 1969)
(judge improperly imprisoned a traffic court defendant for contempt for refusing to answer a
prosecutor's questions on the ground of self-incrimination).
76. 453 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1972).
77. The court emphasized that it relied solely on the complaint and thus it did not have to
reach the issue of the scope of the defendant's contempt power. The court also did not discuss
the assault contention in connection with immunity. But see Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59
(9th Cir. 1974), cited with apparent approval Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 361 n.10
(1978), in which the court characterized such an act as not of a judicial nature and denied
absolute immunity to the defendant. The court said:
The decision to personally evict someone from a court room by the use of physical
force is simply not an act of a judicial nature, and is not such as to require insula-
tion in order that the decision be deliberately reached .... [W]hen a judge exer-
cises physical force in a courtroom, his decision is not amenable to appellate correc-
tion.
500 F.2d at 64.
78. 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971), reconsideration of motion to dismiss denied, 356 F.
Supp. 380 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
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The cases are clear that the term jurisdiction means that the judge must
have both [1] jurisdiction over the person and [2] subject matter if he is to
be immune friom suit for an act performed in his judicial capacity ... [3] A
third element . .. [which] enters into the concept of jurisdiction ... is the
power of the Court to render the particular decision which was given ...
[that is] whether the defendant's action is authorized by any set of condi-
tions or circumstances. 79
After finding that no Ohio statute authorized a judge to order sterilization for
any purpose and no judicial precedent for such an order existed absent a
specific statute, the court concluded: "Because there was no set of cir-
cumstances or conditions under Ohio law which would permit defendant
Gary to order plaintiff to submit to sterilization, the Court determines that
defendant Gary acted wholly without jurisdiction in this matter. Con-
sequently, defendant Gary is not protected by the doctrine of judicial im-
munity." 8 o
These decisions seem to go beyond the Bradley-Pierson approach in treating
the defendant judges as acting in clear absence of jurisdiction. First, they
apparently considered their fact situations to be substantially similar to
Bradley's example of a probate judge who tries criminal cases but substantially
different from the other Bradley example of a criminal court judge who
either convicts a person of an act which is not a crime or imposes an unau-
thorized sentence upon a person. Why this is so is unclear since in Lucarell
the incarceration might be termed an unauthorized sentence and in Wade
the sterilization might be termed an illegal order. Unlike the Bradley pro-
bate judge example, these judges had the power to do something with the
plaintiffs in connection with the reasons the plaintiffs were before them at
the outset. 8 '
Thus, Lucarell and Wade appear in fact to be cases where the judges
acted in "excess of jurisdiction" and not in "clear absence" of it. The errors
made by these judges as to their powers in the particular cases before them
should not be treated as acts in clear absence of jurisdiction. As Bradley
itself recognized, "some of the most difficult and embarassing questions" for
a judge involve his jurisdiction and powers. 82 This was also acknowledged
in a Second Circuit decision predating Lucarell and Wade which involved a
claim based upon plaintiff's conviction for assault by a justice of the peace
who did not have subject matter jurisdiction over this offense. 83 In holding
that absolute immunity attached, the court stated that absolute immunity is
79. Id. at 673.
80. Id. at 674.
81. In Lucarell, the defendant could have fined the plaintiff; in Wade, there was a statute
giving the defendant general subject matter jurisdiction over mentally retarded persons.
82. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 352 (1851).
83. Fanale v. Sheehy, 385 F.2d 866 (2nd Cir. 1967).
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lost only in those exceptional circumstances when it is perfectly clear that a
judge acts in the absence of jurisdiction.8 4
That a judge with general subject matter jurisdiction loses his absolute
immunity if he errs grossly and issues an unauthorized order-the proposi-
tion for which Lucarell and Wade stand-was thus questionable even before
the Supreme Court's 1978 decision in Stump v. Sparkman.8 5 After Stump,
which reversed a Seventh Circuit decision holding that a judge had lost his
absolute immunity, it is clearly untenable. Stump concerned the issue, simi-
lar to that in Wade, of the judicial immunity of a judge who ordered the
sterilization of a fifteen year old girl upon her mother's petition.8 6 The facts
in Stump apparently shocked the Seventh Circuit which noted that the order
was issued in an ex parte proceeding. Further, no guardian ad litem was
appointed to represent the child's interests and no hearing was held. She
never received notice of the petition and neither the petition nor the order
was ever filed in the circuit court.8 7
Applying the Bradley-Pierson test, the Seventh Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court and found that the defendant had acted in clear absence of subject
matter jurisdiction, even though the Circuit Court of DeKalb County was by
statute a court having original and exclusive jurisdiction in all cases at law
and in equity.88 In order for the judge's act to come within the statute, the
court said, it must have either a statutory or common law basis.8 9 After
examining Indiana law, the court found no such basis. Further, it rejected
the defendant's argument that he was exercising his power to fashion new
common law. 90 First, judges "may not use the power to create new deci-
sional law to order extreme and irreversible remedies such as sterilization in
situations where the legislative branch of government has indicated that they
are inappropriate . . .[Otherwise] we would be sanctioning tyranny from the
bench." 91 Alternatively, the court stated that the defendant's exercise of his
common law power was illegitimate "because of his failure to comply with
elementary principles of procedural due process." 92
The Supreme Court reversed. As it had in Pierson, the Court cited Brad-
ley for its approach distinguishing between excess of jurisdiction and the
84. The court stated explicitly that "[w]here jurisdiction depends on the resolution of factual
issues or involves debatable questions of law, judges do not lose their immunity ... [E]xcep-
tions must be confined to situations in which it is perfectly clear that the court acted wholly
without jurisdiction." Id. at 868.
85. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), reversing Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d
172 (7th Cir. 1977).
86. Plaintiff was not told the true reason for her hospitalization. Instead, a pretext was used.
435 U.S. at 353.
87. 552 F.2d at 173.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 174.
90. Id. at 175-76.
91. Id. at 176.
92. Id.
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clear absence of all jurisdiction. It then noted the difficult nature of jurisdic-
tional questions and concluded: "We cannot agree that there was a 'clear
absence of all jurisdiction' in the DeKalb County Circuit Court to consider
the petition presented. ... 93 In reaching this conclusion, the Court men-
tioned the broad jurisdictional grant and, turning the Seventh Circuit's ar-
gument around, observed that "there was no Indiana statute and no case law
in 1971 prohibiting a circuit court, a court of' general jurisdiction, from con-
sidering a petition of the type presented to Judge Stump." 94  The Court,
citing Bradley again, also rejected the Seventh Circuit's due process argu-
ment as "misconceiv[ing] the doctrine of judicial immunity. A judge is abso-
lutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of' au-
thority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors." 95  In short,
the Court broadly construed the scope of the judge's jurisdiction because
"the issue is the immunity of the judge."
The Court then considered and rejected the argument that the judge was
nevertheless not entitled to immunity because his approval of' the petition
was not a "judicial act" as a result of' the informality of the judge's approval
of the petition. 96 Noting that this was the first time such an issue was ever
before it in connection with immunity, the Court agreed that judicial im-
munity would only attach to a judicial act. Relying on one of its decisions in
a different context 9 7 and on several circuit court decisions, 98 the Court
stated:
[T~he factors determining whether an act by a judge is a 'judicial' one
relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function usually
performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether
they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. 99
93. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357.
94. Id. at 358.
95. 1d. at 359.
96. The Court noted that "the petition was not given a docket number, was not placed on
file with the clerk's office, and was approved in an ex parte proceeding without notice to the
minor, without a hearing, and without the appointment of a guardian ad litem." Id. at 360.
97. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945), in which the Court held that the lack of formality
involved in a state court's consideration of an application for admission to the bar did not pre-
vent it from constituting a case or controversy reviewable by the Court.
98. Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974) (judge's physical assault upon plain-
tiff was held not to be a judicial act); McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1972) (judge
was entitled to judicial immunity even though he had plaintiffs arrested, in the apparent exer-
cise of his contempt power, when he was not in his robes, not in the courtroom, and in appar-
ent violation of procedural requirements for contempt citations); Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d
818 (6th Cir. 1970) (judge serving on a board with only legislative and administrative powers
was not acting in a judicial capacity).
99. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978).
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The Court applied these factors to the facts before it and concluded that
despite the informality of the proceedings and their ex parte nature, the
approval of the petition was a judicial act and hence protected.
Justices Stewart, Marshall and Powell vigorously dissented, arguing that
what the judge did "was beyond the pale of anything that could sensibly be
called a judicial act." 10 0  They criticized the majority's factors and instead
contended that the meaning of a "judicial act" derives from those considera-
tions set out in Pierson which support absolute immunity in the first
place.' 0 ' Justice Powell added what he considered to be central: the defen-
dant's "preclusion of any possibility for the vindication of [plaintiff's] rights
elsewhere in the judicial system." 102 He emphasized that the major reason
for absolute immunity is the existence of "alternative forums and methods
for vindicating [private] rights," and that absent such forums, "the underly-
ing assumption of the Bradley doctrine is inoperative."10 3
Stump indicates clearly that the Lucarell and Wade cases were incorrectly
decided. In both cases there was general subject matter jurisdiction and the
defendant's acts were judicial in nature under the Stump majority's reason-
ing. However, in continuing to use the "jurisdiction" approach of Bradley
and Pierson, the Court did little to clarify the factors which distinguish be-
tween "excess of jurisdiction" and "clear absence of all jurisdiction" and the
confusing relation between those factors and the merits. In any event, since
the Court addressed the judicial act question in Stump, the inquiry into
judicial immunity is now roughly parallel to the inquiry into legislative im-
munity. After ascertaining that the defendant's status is that of a legislator or
a judge, an inquiry must be then made into whether the defendant legis-
lator's act was performed in a traditional legislative field or the defendant
judge's act was within his jurisdiction. If so, the next question requires
characterization of the act performed in order to decide whether it was a
legislative act or a judicial act. Thus, despite the "jurisdiction" jargon of the
judicial immunity cases, in reality the same general kinds of questions are
being asked for both legislative and judicial immunity.
However, what is especially disturbing about Stump is the Court's fail-
ure ' 0 4 to answer Justice Powell's point about the unavailability of an alter-
100. Id. at 365.
101. The dissenters stated:
[Tihere was no "case," controversial or otherwise. There were no litigants. There
was and could be no appeal. And there was not even the pretext of a principled
decisionmaking. [There was a] total absence of any of these normal attributes of a
judicial proceeding . . . [thus] the conduct complained of. . . was not a judicial act.
Id. at 368-69.
102. Id. at 369.
103. Id. at 370.
104. The Court mentions the issuance of search warrants as an example of an ex parte pro-
ceeding without recourse to appeal. Id. at 363 n.12. However, while the issuance cannot be
undone by appeal, its adverse effect, if any, can be by a motion to suppress. This sharply
distinguishes search warrants from the ex parte approval of the sterilization petition in Stump.
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native forum to plaintiff because of the judge's conduct. Where there is a
physical assault by a judge upon a person, an act which the Court agreed is
not a judicial act, there is no alternative forum available to the injured per-
son to stop the judge; the damage has already been done. Thus, it makes
sense to hold that judicial immunity is not applicable. In Stump, the sterili-
zation of plaintiff' was the equivalent of a physical assault as to which there
was also no recourse. In both cases the only remedy was retrospective. For
this reason, both acts were similarly not functions "normally performed by a
judge," contrary to the majority's characterization of the judge's approval of
the petition.
In this light, Stump's message is clear: it will be a rare case indeed in
which a judge will lose his absolute immunity. The Court may be saying
about judges what it said long ago about the immunity under federal law of
the Postmaster General:
As in the case of a judicial officer, we recognize a distinction between
action taken by the head of a department in reference to matters which
are manifestly or palpably beyond his authority, and action having more or
less connection with the general matters committed by law to his control
or supervision. 105
Persons Protected by Judicial Immunity
Judges at all levels who act in a judicial capacity ' 0 6 are protected by abso-
lute immunity. This includes justices of the peace, 10 7 municipal referees, 10 8
and presumably judges at both the trial and appellate level. ' 0 9 Occasionally
it becomes necessary to decide whether what is fbrmally called a court in
fact exercises a judicial function; if it does not, but is, for example, "entirely
legislative and administrative," then its members are not considered
judges-even if they are so called-and thus are not protected by absolute
immunity. 110 Some courts have applied absolute immunity to members of
quasi-judicial agencies, comparing them functionally with judges even
though they are clearly not judges. This questionable tendency is especially
marked in connection with parole boards and with courts emphasizing their
quasi-judicial functions as well as their relation "to the operation of a state
judicial and penal system.""'
105. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896) (emphasis added).
106. See generally notes 67-105 and accompanying text infra.
107. Pennebaker v. Chamber, 437 F.2d 66 (3rd Cir. 1971).
108. Lucarell v. McNair, 453 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1972).
109. Clark v. Washington, 366 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1966).
110. Lynch v. Johnson 420 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970) (finding a fiscal court to be nonjudicial in
nature).
111. Silver v. Dickson, 403 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1968). See also, Johnson v. Wells, 566
F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1978); Pate v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 409 F. Supp. 478
(M.D. Ala. 1976).
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There is language in some of the cases suggesting that acts of persons "in
the performance of an integral part of the judicial process" are protected by
absolute judicial immunity."12  This reasoning has been applied to clerks of
court, 113 sheriffs, 1 1 4 probation officers," 1 5 court reporters, 116 and court-
appointed medical examiners. 1 1 7  However, as the Fourth Circuit has
pointed out in McCray v. Maryland,"8 this reasoning is flawed because the
functions of absolute immunity for judges are not applicable to these other
officials who do not make judicial decisions. It makes considerably more
sense to hold that clerks and others are protected only by a qualified immu-
nity. 119 They should, however, be protected by an absolute judicial immu-
nity when they act pursuant to court order or direction.12 0  This exception
to the qualified immunity rule, acknowledged by the Fourth Circuit in
McCray and suggested by the Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Donaldson 121
is fair and prevents disruption of the judicial process.' 2 2  Furthermore, it
explains the result in many of the cases purporting to apply an absolute
immunity rule.' 23
This approach is questionable in view of Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1974), in which
the Supreme Court applied only a qualified immunity to school board members though they
acted in a quasi-judicial capacity.
112. Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir. 1970).
113. Denman v. Leedy, 479 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1973); Smith v. Rosenbaum, 460 F.2d 1019
(3d Cir. 1972); Marcedes v. Barrett, 453 F.2d 391 (3rd Cir. 1971); Davis v. McAteer, 431 F.2d
81 (8th Cir. 1970).
114. People ex rel. Giles v. Thomas, 464 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1972).
115. Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1970).
116. Stewart v. Minnick, 409 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1969).
117. Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1970).
118. 456 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1972).
119. The Eighth Circuit followed McCray in Barnes v. Dorsey, 480 F.2d 1057 (8th Cir.
1973).
120. In Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 460 (3rd Cir. 1969), the court emphasized both
the "manifest unfairness of subjecting one to suit as a consequence of action taken at the direc-
tion of officials over whom the individual actor has no power or control," and the likelihood of
dismissal if the defendant refuses to comply. See also Smith v. Martin, 542 F.2d 688 (6th Cir.
1976); Robinson v. McCorkle, 462 F.2d 111 (3rd Cir. 1972); Sullivan v. Kelleher, 405 F.2d 486
(1st Cir. 1968).
121. 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975). The Court applied a qualified immunity to a state psychiatrist
after it observed that he did not contend he acted pursuant to court order in keeping the
plaintiff confined.
122. Note, The Doctrine of Official Immunity Under the Civil Rights Acts, 68 HARV. L. REV.
1229, 1239 (1955). See also Hazo v. Geltz, 537 F.2d 747 (3rd Cir. 1976), where a deputy sheriff
was sued under 1983 for allegedly causing an invalid levy against plaintiff's personal property
pursuant to a default judgment. In remanding, the court held that only a qualified immunity
would apply unless evidence of "direct judicial supervision," not simply administrative conve-
nience, was shown. Id. at 751.
123. See, e.g., Smith v. Rosenbaum, 460 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1972); People ex rel. Giles v.
Thomas, 464 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1972).
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Injunctive Relief: An Exception to Judicial Immunity
It has been accepted in the circuits, and implied by the Supreme
Court, 124 that judicial immunity is limited to damages and does not extend
to injunctive relief. Littleton v. Berbling, 125 a leading case from the Seventh
Circuit, so held where class discrimination based on race was alleged in
connection with the application of the criminal laws. It relied primarily on
two decisions, also involving class discrimination based on race, which found
that judicial immunity extended only to immunity from damages. 126  How-
ever, the injunctive relief exception is apparently not limited to class dis-
crimination cases. The Second Circuit, in a case which involved plaintiff's
attempt to enjoin disciplinary proceedings instituted against him by the
judges of the Appellate Division of New York, has stated: "[Nbo sound
reason exists for holding that federal courts should not have the power to
issue injunctive relief against the commission of acts in violation of a plain-
tiff's civil rights by state judges acting in their official capacity." 127  The
Fourth Circuit has more recently taken a similar position.1 2 s
Despite this general acceptance of an injunctive relief exception, 129 con-
cern has been expressed about interfering with the exercise of state judicial
discretion. As stated by Judge Dillion, dissenting in Littleton:
[In the cases .. .in which this [exception] has been applied, the equita-
ble relief granted has invariably been in the form of a prohibitory injunc-
tion, confining such officials to the limits of their legal authority. There is a
great difference between ordering an official not to do a particular act,
measurable by objective standards, and in ordering him to exercise his
discretion in a certain general way, measurable only by subjective stan-
dards. 130
124. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974). The Court implied that if there is a
showing of irreparable injury which is both great and immediate there is the possibility that
injunctive relief will issue. It is clear that the Supreme Court is reluctant to permit federal
equitable intervention in proceedings involving state officials. See generally A GUIDE TO SEC-
TION 1983 chapter 5.
125. 468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. O'Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488 (1974).
126. United States v. Clark, 249 F. Supp. 720, 722 (S.D. Ala. 1965) (three judge court) and
United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 738 n.3 (5th Cir. 1967).
127. Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205, 1208 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889
(1972). See also Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 299 F. Supp.
117, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (three judge court), aff'd, 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
128. Timmerman v. Brown, 528 F.2d 811 (4th Cir. 1975). See also Fowler v. Alexander, 478
F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1973) which relied on Littleton. Id. at 696. Fowler did not involve class
discrimination.
129. See Shipp v. Todd, 568 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1978), in which the court held that while a
court clerk acting pursuant to judicial direction was absolutely immune from liability for dam-
ages, he was not immune from injunctive relief ordering him to expunge the plaintiff's state
criminal conviction.
130. Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 415 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd sub. nom. O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
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The Fifth Circuit has expressed a similar note of caution in a case where the
plaintiff in effect was asking the federal court to hold the decision of a state
appellate court to be unconstitutional. While it ended up relying on collat-
eral estoppel, the court did observe that the plaintiff's "requested relief
would directly and irrebutably interfere with a discretionary judicial func-
tion." 131 However, the concern reflected in such cases is not with the
threat to judicial independence stemming from unhappy litigants, as it is in
cases involving actions for damages. The concern is rather with the sensitive
relationship between state and federal courts when the latter attempt to reg-
ulate state judicial conduct. Indeed, the Supreme Court raised this
federalism and comity concern in connection with injunctive relief directed
against judges and prosecutors who were allegedly enforcing the criminal
laws in a racially discriminatory way.' 32
The injunctive relief exception to judicial immunity seems to be the equiv-
alent of a bifurcated approach to the meaning of "person" under section
1983; that is, a judge, because he is absolutely immune, is treated as if he
were not a "person" for damages purposes, but is treated as a "person" for
injunctive relief purposes. Despite the difficulty in another context with such
a bifurcated approach, 133 there is no such difficulty here. The Court would
use the Ex parte Young134 fiction and consider the judge being sued for
injunctive relief as an individual stripped of his official functions and thus as
a "person" for 1983 purposes. Furthermore, applying judicial immunity to a
judge does not mean that he is not a "person," but only that he is a "person"
who is absolutely immune from liability for damages and not from injunctive
relief.
131. Cheramie v. Tucker, 493 F.2d 586, 588 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868
(1974).
132. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499-502 (1974). This was the second ground used in
reversing the Seventh Circuit. See note 125 and accompanying text supra. The first ground was
the absence of a case or controversy.
Federalism and comity concepts are beyond the scope of this Article. These concepts are
however, of considerable significance in cases involving attempts by 1983 plaintiffs to secure
declaratory or injunctive relief in connection with the constitutionality of state statutes involved
in pending state criminal proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and its
numerous progeny. So-called "Younger abstention" is discussed briefly in C. WRIGHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS 229-36 (3d ed. 1976). See generally A GUIDE TO SECTION 1983 chapter 5.
133. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973), which rejected a similar approach for
municipalities, appears to undercut the rationale of the foregoing cases. In holding that
municipalities are not "persons" for section 1983 purposes regardless of the relief sought, the
Court stated that a bifurcated approach to the meaning of "person" was without support. Id. at
513. However, this has all been changed since Monell v. Department of Soc. Serv., 98 S. Ct.
2018, 2041 (1978), which held that cities and counties are "persons" for 1983 damages purposes.
See n.2 supra. Such "persons" can also now be sued for injunctive relief.
134. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES:
IMBLER V. PACHTMAN
The Supreme Court's recent decision in inbler v. Pachtman 135 granting
prosecutorial immunity from liability for damages under section 1983 relied
on Tenney v. Brandhove,13 6 Pierson v. Ray 137 and later cases involving the
immunity of various governmental officials. 138 In Imbler, the plaintiff sued
a state prosecutor for allegedly knowingly using perjured testimony and sup-
pressing material evidence at plaintiff's trial which resulted in his conviction
for murder. The matter at issue was "whether a state prosecuting attorney
who acted within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal
prosecution is amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged depriva-
tions of the defendant's constitutional rights." 139 The Court held the pro-
secutor absolutely immune.
The Court first canvassed its earlier decisions on immunities under 1983,
saying that Tenney "established that § 1983 is to be read in harmony with
general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation
of them."' 140 It then generalized by observing that "each [earlier decision
on 1983 immunities] was predicated upon a considered inquiry into the im-
munity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the in-
terests behind it."1 4 1 Using this approach, the Court next asserted that at
common law prosecutors were absolutely immune from tort liability with
respect to their decisions to initiate and conduct prosecutions' 42 for at least
two reasons: (1) harassment by unfounded litigation which would divert at-
tention from their duties; and (2) the effect of litigation on their indepen-
dence in making decisions. Finally, in concluding that for the same reasons
this should be the 1983 immunity rule as well, the Court mentioned the
following additional considerations: the danger to the honest prosecutor from
those suits which would survive a pleadings challenge; the virtual retrial of
criminal offenses in a new forum, with the resolution of technical cases by
the jury; the adverse effect on the criminal justice system because often the
finders of fact would be denied relevant evidence; and the availability to the
135. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
136. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
137. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
138. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (executives) and Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (1975) (school board officials exercising quasi-judicial functions).
139. 424 U.S. 409, 410 (1976).
140. Id. at 418.
141. id. at 421.
142. Judge Learned Hand wrote of prosecutorial immunity in the much cited case of Gre-
goire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950) as follows:
As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between the evils
inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the end
better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject
those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.
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convicted defendant of various post-trial procedures, and to the public of
criminal prosecution and professional discipline.
Imbler is expressly limited to those activities of a prosecutor which are
"intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, and
thus were functions to which the reasons for absolute immunity apply with
full force."1 43  The Court left open the question of whether Imbler's
rationale would also apply to "those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility
that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer rather
than that of advocate.' 144  It did, however, note that a prosecutor in his
role as advocate frequently acts outside of the courtroom as well as in it, 14 5
thereby suggesting that this role is quite broad and is protected in its en-
tirety by absolute immunity.
The Court also rejected the distinction suggested in the concurring opin-
ion between a prosecutor's knowing use of perjured testimony-to which
immunity should attach-and his knowing suppression of evidence-to
which the three concurring Justices argued it should not. 1 46  Further, the
Court hinted that a public defender and perhaps even court appointed de-
fense counsel likewise share in absolute immunity when it stated: "Attaining
the system's goal of accurately determining guilt or innocence requires that
both the prosecution and the defense have wide discretion in the conduct of
the trial and the presentation of evidence."'' 47
Prosecutorial Immunity in the Circuits
Since Imbler, it is clear that prosecutorial immunity from liability for dam-
ages attaches to those acts of the prosecutor in his role as advocate.' 48  Not
143. 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976).
144. Id. at 430-31.
145. Id. at 431 n.33. Included in the prosecutor's role as advocate, according to the Court,
are the following: deciding whether to present a case to a grand jury or to file an information,
deciding whether and whom to prosecute, deciding what evidence and witnesses to present,
and obtaining, reviewing and evaluating evidence in connection with all the above.
146. Justices White, Brennan and Marshall, concurring in the judgment, reasoned that abso-
lute immunity should not extend to claims of unconstitutional suppression of evidence because
to do so would discourage the disclosure of evidence by prosecutors and thereby injure the
judicial process as well as the defendant in a criminal case. However, the majority rejected this
approach in part because it believed that a claim of using perjured testimony could easily be
converted into a claim of suppressing evidence. Id. at 432-33.
147. Id. at 426 (emphasis added).
148. See, e.g., Ledwith v. Douglas, 568 F.2d 117, 119 (8th Cir. 1978) (immunity protedts a
prosecutor acting in a civil enforcement proceeding to enjoin deceptive trade practices and
obtain restitution for defrauded consumers. Although Imbler dealt with criminal proceedings,
the civil enforcement proceeding in Ledwith is functionally comparable to a criminal proceed-
ing. As such, the result in Ledwith is sound); Perez v. Borchers, 567 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir.
1978) (per curiam) and Jennings v. Schuman, 567 F.2d 1213, 1221 (3d Cir. 1977) (immunity
protects the prosecutor who allegedly conspired to bring false criminal charges against the plain-
tiff); Hilliard v. Williams, 540 F.2d 220, 221 (6th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (immunity protects a
prosecutor who allegedly withheld evidence favorable to plaintiff and instructed a witness to
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so clear, however, is where the prosecutor's role as advocate ends and his
other roles begin. This was a recurring issue in the circuits before Imbler
and remains so because Imbler expressly left open the question of the scope
of' prosecutorial immunity in non-advocacy situations.
For example, the prosecutor as investigator has been the subject of con-
siderable litigation. In Robichaud v. Ronan, 149 a much quoted pre-lmbler
decision which involved a prosecutor accused of various attempts to intimi-
date the plaintiff while in custody to confess to a murder she didn't commit,
despite the lack of probable cause to hold her, the Ninth Circuit held that
the investigative activities of a prosecutor are protected only by a qualified
immunity. 150 The Seventh Circuit, in another pre-Inbler case, Hampton v.
City of Chicago,1 5 1 explicitly used the Robichaud approach to reject the
prosecutors' claim of absolute immunity. In Hampton, plaintiffs' complaint
could have been read as alleging that the prosecutors and others had con-
spired to plan and execute a raid in order to kill certain members of' the
Black Panther party. The court read the complaint more narrowly as alleging
the planning and execution of' the raid in order simply to obtain evidence.
Still, the court rejected the contention that "evidence gathering is so closely
related to the presentation of evidence at trial that it should also be clothed
with immunity." 152
A recent post-Imbler district court decision followed Robichaud and
Hampton in holding that absolute immunity was not available to a prosecutor
who allegedly forced the plaintiff to become a police agent and informant
through threats and coercion.153  The court simply characterized this activity
testifty evasively, if not falsely); Bruce v. Wade, 537 F.2d 850, 852 (5th Cir. 1976) (immunity
protects a prosecutor who allegedly improperly had the plaintiff' indicted and, at the trial, sub-
orned perjury and filed false affidavits); Flood v. Harrington, 532 F.2d 1248, 1251 (9th Cir.
1976) (immunity protects government attorneys involved in litigation in connection with the
collection of income taxes. Although Flood was not a 1983 case, Imbler's reasoning was found
applicable).
149. 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965).
150. The court reasoned as follows:
We believe, however, that when a prosecuting attorney acts in some capacity other
than his quasi-judicial capacity, then the reason for his im munity- integral relation-
ship between his acts and the judicial process-ceases to exist. If he acts in the role
of a policeman, then why should he not be liable, as is the policeman, if, in so
acting, he has deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Federal Constitution and laws? . .. To us, it seems neither appropriate nor
justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not the
other.
Id. at 536-37. Robichaud relied on the earlier similar case of Lewis v. Brantigam, 227 F.2d 124
(5th Cir. 1955), in which the defendant prosecutor allegedly attempted to coerce a guilty plea
from a criminal charge. The Fifth Circuit held that prosecutorial immunity does not extend to
such investigative activity.
151. 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973).
152. Id. at 609.
153. Tomko v, Lees, 416 F. Supp. 1137 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
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as "of a police/investigative nature," 154  However, Imbler casts some doubt
upon the propriety of a "bright line" test which simply asks whether the
activity is of the kind in which police engage.
1 55
In addition to the investigatory role of prosecutors, courts have distin-
guished the advocacy role from still other prosecutorial activities. 156 The
District of Columbia Circuit held, albeit in a non-1983 case, that the U.S.
Attorney General's role in directing law enforcement activity was not abso-
lutely protected from liability for damages for alleged Fourth and Fifth
Amendment violations.' 5 7  The prosecutor's role as advocate has also been
distinguished from situations in which a corporation counsel allegedly failed
to issue an advisory opinion which would have permitted plaintiff to speak at
a public gathering.' 58 A similar conclusion was reached when a prosecutor
sent a critical letter to a legislative investigating committee, with copies to
the press, about the plaintiff against whom a murder charge had been dis-
missed and no judicial proceedings were pending or contemplated. 1 59  It
was stated in these post-Imbler cases that there was no judicial or quasi-
judicial significance to the defendants' conduct. A pre-Imbler Ninth Circuit
case reached a similar conclusion about an allegedly wrongful advisory opin-
ion given by a city attorney which resulted in plaintiff's discharge from his
job. 1 60  The court refused to extend absolute immunity "to a lawyer in a
public law office giving legal advice to a public entity in respect of matters
that are not the subject of pending litigation. The purpose of according judi-
cial immunity is to protect the integrity of the judicial process . . . not to
shield lawyers . . . when the alleged invasion did not occur during the per-
formance of acts that are an integral part of the judicial process."' 6
The Third Circuit recently noted what it called the "thorny issue" of pro-
secutorial immunity in connection with still another prosecutorial role: the
defendant's firing of plaintiff, his first assistant, for publicly contradicting him
154. Id. at 1139.
155. In a possibly significant footnote, the Supreme Court observed:
We recognize that the duties of the prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State
involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from
the courtroom . . . Preparation, both for the initiation of the criminal process and
for a trial, may require the obtaining, reviewing and evaluating of evidence ...
Drawing a proper line between these functions may present difficult questions, but
this case does not require us to anticipate them.
424 U.S. 409, 431 n.33 (emphasis added). This language strongly suggests that the Court
realizes both that prosecutorial functions may overlap and that the scope of the prosecutor's role
as advocate is quite broad. If it is taken literally, then the prosecutorial activities in Robichaud
and Hampton may be outside the scope of 1983 liability for damages.
156. A commentator categorized the various roles as follows: executive, ministerial, inves-
tigatory, civil/advisory, public official and individual. Note, Delimiting the Scope of Prosecuto-
rial Immunity from Section 1983 Damage Suits, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 173, 187-188 (1977).
157. Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
158. Shifrin v. Wilson, 412 F. Supp. 1282 (D. D.C. 1976).
159. Cahalan v. Walker, 542 F.2d 681 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977).
160. Donovan v. Reinhold, 433 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1970).
161. Id. at 743.
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about his role concerning a concluded criminal case. 162 The defendant ar-
gued "that prosecutorial immunity should be held to cloak administrative
actions such as the discharge involved here. The hiring and firing of the
subordinates through whom he acts .. . is the District Attorney's ultimate
discretionary act in his service to the public..."163 But the court avoided
being "pricked", and ruled against plaintiff on the merits. It would appear,
though, that the defendant's act was clearly administrative and not taken in
his role as advocate. Just as a legislator's discharge of an employee was held
not protected by a legislator's absolute immunity, because it was not a legis-
lative act, 164 so too in all likelihood would this defendant's conduct be un-
protected by a prosecutor's absolute immunity because it was not an advo-
cate's act.
Situations may arise in which the prosecutor is found to have acted not as
a prosecutor, but rather as an individual. A 1977 Third Circuit decision indi-
cated that a special prosecutor without authority to act as prosecutor in the
plaintiff's case would not be absolutely immune from liability for damages
arising from a claim that he had conspired with others to bring false criminal
charges against the plaintiff'.165 In another Third Circuit decision that same
year, the plaintiff, a former congressman, sued a United States Attorney for
allegedly attempting to destroy him politically by deliberate leaks to the
press of fidse information in connection with grand jury proceedings. 166  In
holding that the defendant was protected only by a qualified immunity, the
court left open the scope of prosecutorial immunity in a nonadvocate con-
text. Instead, the court found that the allegations of deliberate leaks not only
went beyond the advocate's role but also exceeded that of the prosecutor as
investigator and administrator. 167 The court failed to mention the pros-
ecutor's role as a public official who is accountable to the public at large.
This concern with the varied roles of the prosecutor is unique. Unlike
legislators and judges whose exposure to potential liability will generally
arise in connection with either legislating or judging, the prosecutor not only
prosecutes, but investigates, administers, executes and the like. His expo-
sure to potential liability will arise in varied situations which seem to admit
of no straightforward immunity approach which is relatively easy to ap-
ply. 168 Therefore, to the extent that lmbler's rationale is tied to the pros-
ecutor's broadly construed role as advocate and is based on a concern with
162. Sprague v. Fitzpatrick, 546 F.2d 560, 564 (3d Cir. 1976).
163. Id. at 564.
164. Davis v. Passman, 544 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1977). See notes 29-32 and accompanying text
supra.
165. Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213 (3d Cir. 1977).
166. Helstoski v. Goldstein, 552 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (United States Attor-
ney).
167. Id. at 566.
168. If, for example, a "jurisdiction" approach were taken, comparable to that for judges,
then absolute immunity would extend to all the traditional prosecutorial roles. Whatever dif-
ficulties the "jurisdiction" approach presents, and there are many, see notes 57-134 and accom-
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independent decision making, retrying criminal offenses and the adverse im-
pact on the criminal justice system, distinctions will inevitably have to be
drawn between this role and all the others. If, however, the policy underly-
ing Imbler's rationale is based more on protecting honest prosecutors and
avoiding the diversion of a prosecutor's attention, then so long as the
prosecutor is acting within a traditional prosecutorial role, 16 9 he will be
accorded an absolute immunity. It is a fair prediction that at least the
prosecutorial role of investigator will be accorded absolute immunity and
assimilated into the advocate's role, in part because of the difficulty in draw-
ing a satisfactory line between the prosecutor as advocate and as investigator
where there are pending or contemplated criminal matters. The Supreme
Court may eventually hold that if absolute immunity for prosecutors is to be
effective, a prosecutor should not have to guess whether what he is doing is
advocative or investigative. 170
Regardless of where the Imbler absolute immunity line is drawn, it is
clear that one of the major purposes of absolute immunity is to avoid im-
plicating the merits of the allegations of unlawful conduct against a pro-
secutor. Thus, the reasoning in pre-hmbler cases about prosecutorial conduct
which is "clearly beyond the proper exercise of his authority and exceed[ing]
any possible construction of the power granted to this office"171 is no longer
to be followed. It improperly focuses on the unauthorized or ultra vires
nature of the conduct and not on the role of the prosecutor. Such reasoning
led to a result in a 1974 Seventh Circuit decision which is also now clearly
incorrect after Imbler. 172 There, the refusal of a prosecutor to assist the
plaintiff in regaining his property by prosecuting those unlawfully possessing
it was characterized as outside the scope of the prosecutor's duties and il-
legal and hence protected by qualified immunity only.
Consequently, it is surprising that the Ninth Circuit recently used this
very approach in a post-Imbler case. Briley v. State of California 173 was a
1983 action for damages brought against a trial judge, prosecuting attorneys
and others for alleged violations of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. The
plaintiff had been charged with child molestation but was offered the oppor-
tunity to plead guilty to a lesser offense provided he consent to castration.
The plaintiff consented to this surgery even though the plea bargain was
never recorded and a court order was never entered approving it. As to the
panying text supra, it seems somewhat easier to apply in many situations than an approach to
prosecutorial immunity which focuses on a particular role.
169. This includes the role of an administrator or investigator acting within his "jurisdiction,"
by analogy to the judiciary.
170. Compare Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), in which the Court indicated that a
judge's jurisdictional errors are to be treated the same as other legal errors for purposes of
absolute judicial immunity.
171. Martin v. Merola, 532 F.2d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 1976) (Lumbard, J., concurring) (per
curiam).
172. Holton v. Boman, 493 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1974).
173. 564 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1977).
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immunity issue, the plaintiff' argued that there was no legal authority what-
ever for district attorneys to require castration and therefore absolute im-
munity was inappropriate. Agreeing with this approach to prosecutorial im-
munity, the Ninth Circuit remanded to determine whether the state trial
judge "would have arguably had some common-law or statutory basis for
ordering Briley to submit to castration had he been convicted for the child
molestation charge. If such authority is found and, thus, judicial immunity
attaches, the district attorneys ... would be immune from §1983 liability
for misrepresentations .... "174 The court cited the Seventh Circuit opin-
ion in Stump v. Sparkman (prior to reversal by the Supreme Court) 175 and
the district court decision in Wade v. Bethesda Hospital 176 as "persuasive
authority that a court, at least when ordering the extreme remedy of sterili-
zation, must have specific legislative or common-law authority for doing
so,"1 77 and then made the district attorneys' immunity dependent on the
judge's.
After Imbler, however, and even without the Court's decision in Stump, it
is clear that district attorneys should be immune when they act as advocates
in connection with a specific criminal case. To make their immunity depen-
dent solely upon the judge's not only misdirects the inquiry but also, to the
extent it focuses on statutory or common law authority, necessarily impli-
cates the merits. Yet Imbler was designed to preclude just such an inquiry
where a prosecutor acts as an advocate. Furthermore, the Court's decision in
Stump now makes abundantly clear that the "legislative or common law au-
thority" approach to judicial immunity is wrong. Consequently, Briley's ap-
proach is similarly incorrect.
It should be noted, finally, that this discussion of Imbler and its reception
in the circuits is limited to prosecutorial immunity for liability for damages.
For reasons similar to those discussed earlier in connection with injunctive
relief against legislators and judges, 178 it is likely that injunctive relief is also
available even after Imbler against prosecutors in appropriate situations. 179 A
post-Imbler Third Circuit decision broadly stating the contrary in connection
with the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief' against a prosecutor appears
incorrect.' 8 0 Because there the plaintiff sought to have his conviction set
aside, the case is better treated more narrowly as one in which the pro-
secutor did not have authority to grant the requested relief.
174. Id. at 858.
175. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub. norn. Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
176. 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
177. 564 F.2d at 854.
178. See notes 52-56, 124-133 and accompanying text supra.
179. The Supreme Court has, however, expressed reservations about injunctions which ap-
pear either to interfere unnecessarily with a prosecutor's discretion, O'Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488 (1974), or to impinge upon comity concerns. See generally note 132 supra.
180. Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1976).
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ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
The Immunity of Public Defenders
The circuits discussing the immunity of public defenders have generally
concluded that they, like prosecutors, are protected by absolute immunity in
their role as advocates. A significant pre-Imbler decision of the Third Cir-
cuit, Brown v. Joseph,"8 ' which involved an allegedly improperly induced
guilty plea, justified this result on the ground that assuming prosecutors and
public defenders act in analogous although opposite roles, the policies sought
to be achieved by prosecutorial immunity apply to public defender immunity
as well.1
8 2
In two post-Imbler cases involving claims that public defenders had
breached a plea bargain and had failed to respond to requests for help in
connection with the preparation of a habeas corpus petition, the Fourth and
Ninth Circuits 183 followed Brown and the clear implication of the Court's
language in Imbler regarding the need for broad trial discretion for "both the
prosecution and the defense." 1 84 They accordingly held that public defend-
ers are protected by absolute immunity. The Seventh Circuit's contrary
result in a pre-Imbler case 185 was always suspect, because it both relied on a
qualified immunity rule for prosecutors 18 6 and misread the Third Circuit's
decision in Brown. 18 7 It has now been expressly repudiated by the Seventh
Circuit. 18 8 The trend therefore is to apply absolute immunity to both pros-
ecutors and public defenders. It is worth noting, however, that the previ-
ously discussed line drawing problems relating to different prosecutorial
roles will similarly arise in connection with public defenders.
181. 463 F.2d 1046 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973).
182. The court stated:
We perceive no valid reason to extend this immunity to state and federal pros-
ecutors and judges and to withhold it from state-appointed and state-subsidized
defenders . . . [This reflects] a public policy encouraging free exercise of profes-
sional discretion in the discharge of pre-trial, trial and post-trial obligations . . .
There are other considerations of public policy. First, there is the desirability of
encouraging able men and women to assume Public Defender roles . . . . Moreover
• . . if a civil rights suit . . . is a constant threat to the Attorney involved, then
there would be a chilling effect upon Defense Counsel's tactics. Defense Counsel
would be caught in an intrinsic conflict of protecting himself and representing his
client.
Id. at 1048-49.
183. Miller v. Barilla, 549 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1977); Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir.
1976).
184. 424 U.S. at 426. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits mentioned additional concerns with
frivolous claims by inmates, the use of defender time to defend against such claims when other
inmates need help, and the effect of 1983 litigation on the limited resources of public defender
agencies.
185. John v. Hurt, 489 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
186. Id. at 788.
187. Id.
188. Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam). This decision also
exhaustively discussed a troublesome state action issue and concluded that state action was
present. See generally A GUIDE TO SECTION 1983 chapter 2.
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DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSION
Of the Supreme Court's three 1983 absolute immunity cases, the one most
worth pondering is Imbler v. Pachtnan which extended absolute immunity
to prosecutors. Legislators and judges are sui generis and both as a matter of
historical background and 1983 policy, their absolute immunity is under-
standable. Furthermore, 1983 remains largely intact despite this absolute
immunity. In Imbler, however, the Court seems to have embarked on a
policy oriented approach to absolute immunity in which 1983 policy gets lost
in the shuffle. This approach, though, downplays the "person" language of
1983 which must be broadly construed if 1983 liability is to have an effect on
official conduct. Moreover, this "person" language indicates that Congress
already made the policy determination that most individuals are "persons"
for 1983 purposes. Furthermore, to the extent that the issue arises in the
future, it may prove unworkable to draw a line around the prosecutor and
stop there. As was seen, public defenders are the next likely candidates for
absolute immunity protection, and there may be others.
On the other hand, the Court may ultimately limit the absolute immunity
categories to state legislators, judges and prosecutors and public defenders
involved in criminal trials. This would narrow the scope of 1983, but not
significantly undercut it, because all other individuals not involved in legis-
lating, judging, or trying criminal cases would still be considered "persons"
for 1983 damages liability purposes. What the Supreme Court will in fact do
remains to be seen.1 8 9
189. As this Article went to print, the United States Supreme Court decided Lake County
Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, no. 7-1327 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1979). Although the
opinion has not been published, the Court held that absolute immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment is applicable to local and regional legislatures. See notes 44-56 and accompanying
text supra.
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